

The Honorable Robert J. Bryan

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT TACOMA**

UGOCHUKWU GOODLUCK NWAUZOR,  
FERNANDO AGUIRRE-URBINA,  
individually and on behalf of all those  
similarly situated,  
  
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,  
  
v.  
  
THE GEO GROUP, INC.,  
  
Defendant/Counter-Claimant.

Case No. 3:17-cv-05769-RJB

**DEFENDANT THE GEO GROUP, INC.’S  
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS’  
PROPOSED AMENDED NOTICE PLAN**

On January 10, 2020, the Court held a pretrial conference where the parties discussed (1) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend the Notice Plan; and (2) the timing of the notice in accordance with this Court’s Agenda for the Pre-Trial Conference (ECF 232). Pursuant to the proceedings at the January 10, 2020 pretrial conference, and this Court’s subsequent Minute Order (ECF 235), GEO hereby submits its opposition and objections to Plaintiffs’ newly proposed amended notice plan – filed with the Court via email on Monday, January 13, 2020.

**I. THE NOTICE PLAN**

On January 9, 2019, Plaintiffs submitted their initial notice plan, which included a proposal to provide notice by direct mail. ECF 138 at 5. Additionally, the notice plan anticipated a sixty (60) day opt-out period. ECF 138 at 6. The notice also provided that the parties would agree to the identity of the class notice administrator, subject to Court approval. ECF 138 at 3. The order provided that class notice documents “will be translated into Spanish and other

1 languages corresponding to the countries in which a significant portion of the Class Members  
2 reside.” In the event that mail was returned as undeliverable, the order instructed the class notice  
3 administrator to use the best efforts to obtain corrected addresses and re-mail the class notices.  
4 ECF 138 at 5. The notice plan also provided for a myriad of publication notice formats including  
5 Google Display Network, Facebook Audience Exchange Ad Network, Instagram, and Twitter—  
6 which would be tailored based upon the “make-up of the class list.” 138 at 6. Additionally, the  
7 notice plan required a dedicated website and a toll-free phone number with live call center support  
8 in “appropriate languages that Class Members may call for additional information about this  
9 deadline.” Finally, the plan detailed a procedure for tracking opt-outs: fifteen (15) days after the  
10 opt-out deadline, class counsel was to file a report with the Court about which individuals opted  
11 out.

12 GEO did not oppose a class notice consistent with the plan submitted to the Court, and  
13 noted that it reserved any objections it may have in the event that the actual notice as disseminated  
14 does not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Following the oral argument on  
15 the Motion to Amend Notice, the Court’s advisory order, and Plaintiffs’ filing of the Plaintiffs’  
16 Amended Notice Plan—GEO now objects that the amended notice, which departs from that  
17 agreed upon a year ago, does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 nor the constraints of  
18 constitutional due process.

## 19 II. PLAINTIFFS’ PROPOSED NOTICE PLAN

20 Plaintiffs now propose reducing the notice period to a period of thirty (30) days,  
21 beginning on January 24, 2020 and ending on February 24, 2020. Under the proposed plan, GEO  
22 will not know the identity of the opt-outs until trial has begun, and the Court will not have that  
23 information until sometime thereafter. Plaintiffs’ proposed plan eliminates mailed notice to all  
24 individuals other than those who remain detained. Plaintiffs propose publication notice via social  
25 media ads, press releases, and radio advertisements. Plaintiffs also propose posting notice in  
26 “conspicuous areas” of the Northwest Ice Processing Center (“NWIPC”).

27 Plaintiffs propose providing radio notice as follows:

- 1 • 28 spots airing on News-Talk radio in Mexico City, Mexico
- 2 • 28 spots airing on News-Talk radio in Guadalajara, Mexico
- 3 • 28 spots airing on Ranchero/Entertainment radio in San Salvador, El Salvador
- 4 • 28 spots airing on Ranchero/News radio in Guatemala City, Guatemala
- 5 • 28 spots airing on News/Information radio in Tegucigalpa, Honduras

6 As such, radio notice will be limited to less than one radio ad per day on a single radio channel in  
7 each identified city. There will be *no* radio notice in the United States or non-Spanish speaking  
8 countries. Thus, the radio notice is incapable of being an adequate substitute to the mailed notice  
9 in the United States.

10 The proposed social media notice will “target Spanish-speaking adults” (18-55 years old)  
11 in Washington, Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and 10-mile radius of cities  
12 along U.S./Mexico border. It will not provide notice broadly to those in the United States nor  
13 will it provide notice to non-Spanish speakers. Beyond social media, it is unclear where and  
14 when the proposed media notice will be published. What is clear is that it will not be provided in  
15 print, and therefore only individuals with access to the internet, and the requisite publications,  
16 will receive notice. GEO is unaware whether these publications will be blocked by paywalls.

17 Plaintiffs propose implementing their plan through JND, a notice administrator  
18 unilaterally chosen by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs do not provide any explanation for how these methods  
19 are likely to reach class members, or how they will provide the best notice possible.

### 20 **III. OBJECTIONS TO THE ADEQUACY OF THE NOTICE PLAN**

21 “Given that class action procedures are conceptualized as an exception to the  
22 general rule that only parties to a lawsuit are legally bound by a final  
23 judgment, and that interested parties normally have a real voice in the strategy  
24 and management of the litigation, the procedure can be tolerated, if not  
25 completely justified, **only if there is fealty to both the spirit and the letter  
26 of the procedural rules, especially those relating to notice. Responsibility  
27 for compliance is placed primarily upon the active participants in the  
lawsuit, especially upon counsel for the class, for, in addition to the  
normal obligations of an officer of the court, and as counsel to parties to  
the litigation, class action counsel possess, in a very real sense, fiduciary  
obligations to those not before the court.** The ultimate responsibility of  
course is committed to the district court in whom, as the guardian of the rights

1 of the absentees, is vested broad administrative, as well as adjudicative,  
2 power.”

3 *Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc.*, 483 F.2d 824, 831–32 (3d Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).

4 **A. Notice Should be Mailed.**

5 Given the importance of notice to ensuring that any judgment is binding upon all class  
6 members, GEO believes that it is not appropriate to forego mailed notice in this circumstance.  
7 While Plaintiffs characterize the addresses as unworkable, GEO again disagrees. *All* information  
8 available was provided to Plaintiffs at their request.<sup>1</sup> As such, the list includes multiple addresses  
9 for many individuals. Those addresses consist of the information provided by class members to  
10 ICE. Where there are multiple addresses for each individual, the addresses are broken down by  
11 type, including, but not limited to, the following categories: Work, Mailing Address, Permanent  
12 Residence, Safe House, U.S. Address, Foreign Address, and Institution. Many of the duplicate  
13 addresses indicate that the individual is in “DHS Custody,” with no street address, or provide the  
14 address for the NWIPC. A simple pivot table shows that only 23,704 of the addresses are for the  
15 United States, or just over two addresses per class member.<sup>2</sup> *Larson v. AT & T Mobility LLC*, 687  
16 F.3d 109, 124 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[I]ndividual notice must be delivered to class members who can  
17 be reasonably identified, and that the costs required to actually deliver notice should not easily  
18 cause a court to permit the less satisfactory substitute of notice by publication.”). This makes  
19 sense as, given the circumstances of their detention, every class member *should* have at least one  
20 address indicating where they are (or were) detained. When the “DHS Custody” addresses and  
21 NWIPC addresses are removed, the remaining addresses represent those which ICE and GEO has  
22 for individuals. GEO is not aware of any reason – other than class counsels’ obvious attempt to  
23 avoid the costs associated with mailing notice – why these addresses are not sufficient to provide  
24 the best notice in the circumstances. *Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts*, 472 U.S. 797, 812, 105 S.

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>1</sup> Had GEO instead been asked to only provide the U.S. addresses of individuals, it would have avoided many of  
Plaintiffs’ perceived deficiencies.

27 <sup>2</sup> These addresses are for approximately 8,900 different individuals.

1 Ct. 2965, 2975, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1985) (“[W]here a fully descriptive notice is sent first-class  
2 mail to each class member, with an explanation of the right to ‘opt out,’ satisfies due process.”);  
3 *Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin*, 417 U.S. 156, 175, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2151, 40 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1974)  
4 (requiring mailed notice where there was “nothing to show that individual notice cannot be mailed  
5 to each.”).

6 In its initial opposition to amending the class notice, GEO argued that the best approach  
7 would be to work with the class notice administrator to identify whether the list could be  
8 narrowed. This step would have, at a minimum, provided a neutral third party’s position on the  
9 data, as opposed to the parties’ diametrically opposed positions. At the time of the hearing, GEO  
10 had not received any additional information about whether the class list could be narrowed by the  
11 class notice administrator. To GEO’s knowledge, Plaintiffs have not worked with a class notice  
12 administrator to identify whether the addresses provided by ICE and GEO can be narrowed using  
13 the National Change of Address system.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, this approach is regularly used by experienced  
14 class counsel and often narrows the number of missing or incomplete addresses. *See e.g., Yue v.*  
15 *Conseco Life Ins. Co.*, No. CV 11-09506 AHM SHX, 2013 WL 5289743, at \*5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6,  
16 2013) (utilizing National Change of Address in notice process); *Bolton v. U.S. Nursing Corp.*, No.  
17 C 12-04466 LB, 2013 WL 2456564, at \*5 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2013) (same); *Sandoval v.*  
18 *Tharaldson Employee Mgmt., Inc.*, No. EDCV 08-482-VAP(OP), 2010 WL 2486346, at \*3 (C.D.  
19 Cal. June 15, 2010) (utilizing National Change of Address database to narrow the missing or out-  
20 of-date addresses). And, GEO has confirmed that that the class notice administrator selected by  
21 Plaintiffs, JND, has these capabilities. *See* <https://www.jndla.com/notice-program> (last visited  
22 January 14, 2020) (“JND Class Action Administration can work with data from a variety of  
23 sources. We transcribe class member information from physical documents and utilize a variety of  
24 research tools to identify the most accurate and up-to-date address information for class  
25 members.”).

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27 <sup>3</sup> The U.S. Postal service maintains the National change of Address database and tracks individuals who have moved. *See* NCOA Processing, Experian, available at <https://www.edq.com/services/ncoa-processing/>.

1           **B. If Notice is Not Mailed, Plaintiffs’ Proposed Notice Should Be Modified.**

2           Should the Court eliminate mailed notice, GEO has significant concerns about how class  
3 notice will reach a significant portion of the class, and believes that whatever plan is ultimately  
4 implemented should be provided to GEO and the Court. On January 13, 2019, Plaintiffs provided  
5 GEO with the notice plan proposed by JND for the first time. GEO provided Plaintiffs with the  
6 proposals below, but Plaintiffs opposed any changes to the breadth or reach of the notice plan  
7 described below.

8           To comply with the commands of due process, each absent member of the class must  
9 receive *adequate* notice. This issue is, and should be of great importance to both GEO, Plaintiffs,  
10 and the Court. Without adequate notice, absent parties cannot be bound by a decision in favor of  
11 *either side. Faber v. Ciox Health, LLC*, 944 F.3d 593, 603 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[P]arties are not  
12 bound to class action judgments until given a full and fair opportunity to litigate.”). Indeed, GEO  
13 has significant concerns about whether the proposed notice is adequate. While it does not appear  
14 that JND has analyzed the class list, GEO has reviewed the list and identified addresses for 124  
15 different countries, both Spanish speaking and non-Spanish speaking. Of those, just over half are  
16 from Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala (the countries which Plaintiff proposes to  
17 focus upon almost exclusively). Dec. of Barnacle, ¶¶ 4,5,8. The remainder includes individuals  
18 from Africa, India, China, and myriad of other countries. It appears that under this plan, Plaintiff  
19 Nwauzor, who is non-Spanish-speaking, would be excluded from the intended audience. Indeed,  
20 Transactional Records Access Clearing House (“TRAC”) data, relied upon by Plaintiffs’ expert  
21 Christopher Strawn, provides a similar snapshot of the demographics of the NWIPC. Dec. of  
22 Barnacle, ¶ 10, Exs. A, B, and C. In the class list provided by GEO, a significant number of class  
23 members provided United States addresses in addition to foreign addresses—thus mailed notice  
24 would have provided a broader reach than the now-proposed publication-only plan. Dec. of  
25 Barnacle, ¶ 9. Accordingly, GEO proposes the following modifications to the notice plan.

26           **C. Publication Notice (Non-Social Media)**

27           It is GEO’s position that if mailed notice is eliminated (which it does not believe should

1 occur), and the time to opt-out is reduced, publication notice should be effectuated through at least  
2 one (1) major United States newspaper to take the place of the previously proposed mailed United  
3 States notice. “[I]t is important to keep in mind that a significant portion of class members in  
4 certain cases may have limited or no access to email or the Internet.” *Rosas v. Sarbanand Farms,*  
5 *LLC*, No. C18-0112-JCC, 2019 WL 859225, at \*2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 22, 2019) (quoting Fed. R.  
6 Civ. P. 23(c) Advisory Committee Notes). Because many individuals may not have access to the  
7 internet, and because class members identified addresses across the country, GEO believes  
8 publication notice should be included in at least one (1) major United States publication. Indeed,  
9 many major publications have frequently reported stories about this case.

10 **D. Publication Notice (Social Media).**

11 In addition to social media ads in the relevant Spanish-speaking countries, GEO asks that  
12 the social media notice (or other digital notice) be geared towards a nationwide audience to  
13 compensate for the elimination of mailed notice. This notice should not exclusively focus on  
14 Spanish speakers, but should also be directed at demographics likely to reach the non-Spanish  
15 speaking half of the class.

16 **E. Posted Notice.**

17 Plaintiffs propose posting notice inside the NWIPC. GEO has previously raised concerns  
18 about whether ICE will permit this posting. Plaintiffs have not provided any indication that they  
19 have cleared this procedure with ICE. Thus, to avoid additional delay stemming from obtaining  
20 ICE approval, GEO believes that long-form notice should be mailed to the individuals in the  
21 NWIPC.

22 **F. Opt-out Timing.**

23 Finally, while this Court has previously upheld a thirty (30) day opt out period, it did so  
24 where class members were afforded thirty (30) days to “postmark their opt-out requests.” *See*  
25 *e.g., Pierce v. Novastar Mortg., Inc.*, No. C05-5835RJB, 2007 WL 1046914, at \*2 (W.D. Wash.  
26 Apr. 2, 2007). Here, it is not clear the compressed timeline would provide putative class  
27 members thirty (30) days to postmark their opt-outs. Instead, it appears that any individual

1 wishing to opt-out would need to mail their notice well before the opt-out deadline in order to  
2 ensure their notice is received prior to trial. Indeed, no judgment can be entered without  
3 specifying and describing those to whom notice was directed, those who did not request  
4 exclusion, and those whom the Court finds to be class members. Rule 23(c)(3)(B). Thus, the  
5 notice timing raises serious questions about whether it will afford due process, particularly given  
6 that the group of putative plaintiffs may be located abroad and mailing may be significantly  
7 delayed. GEO maintains that the original sixty (60) day notice period is necessary to ensure the  
8 best notice possible, and hence due process, in this case.

#### 9 IV. OBJECTIONS TO THE TIMING OF THE NOTICE PLAN

10 “The purpose of Rule 23(c)(2) is to ensure that the plaintiff class receives notice of the  
11 action well before the merits of the case are adjudicated.” *Schwarzschild v. Tse*, 69 F.3d 293, 295  
12 (9th Cir. 1995); *Darrington v. Assessment Recovery of Washington, LLC*, No. C13-0286-JCC,  
13 2014 WL 3858363, at \*3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 5, 2014). “[T]he notice requirement for 23(b)(3)  
14 class actions is rooted in due process and clearly mandatory under Rule 23(c)(2)(B)”, *Brown v.*  
15 *Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico*, 613 F.3d 44, 51 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing *Eisen v. Carlisle &*  
16 *Jacquelin*, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974). “Ultimately, class notice should be completed before  
17 dispositive motions are decided.” *McCurley v. Royal Seas Cruises, Inc.*, No. 17-CV-00986-BAS-  
18 AGS, 2019 WL 3817970, at \*4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2019). As the Ninth Circuit has explained,  
19 when Rule 23 was drafted,

20 [m]any commentators objected that one-way intervention had the effect of  
21 giving collateral estoppel effect to the judgment of liability in a case where the  
22 estoppel was not mutual. This was thought to be unfair to the defendant. To  
23 meet the point that one-way intervention was unfair to the defendant, the  
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules concluded that class members  
should be brought in prior to the determination of defendant’s liability, thus  
making the estoppel mutual.

24 *Schwarzschild*, 69 F.3d at 295 (quoting *Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.*, 496 F.2d 747, 759 (3d Cir.  
25 1974)); *see also* Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 Amendments to Rule 23 (“Under ...  
26 subdivision (c)(3), one-way intervention is excluded”). “The doctrine is ‘one-way’ because a  
27 plaintiff would not be bound by a decision that favors the defendant but could decide to benefit



1 from a decision favoring the class. After amendment, the rule no longer left defendants  
2 vulnerable, as the California Supreme Court has vividly analogized, to ‘being pecked to death by  
3 ducks.’” *Villa v. San Francisco Forty-Niners, Ltd.*, 104 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2015)  
4 (citations omitted). Without the one-way intervention doctrine, “one plaintiff could sue and lose;  
5 another could sue and lose; and another and another until one finally prevailed; then everyone  
6 else would ride on that single success.” *Id.* Accordingly, the rule stands for the proposition that  
7 “a decision rendered by the district court before a class has been properly certified and notified is  
8 not binding upon anyone but the named plaintiffs.” *Schwarzschild*, 69 F.3d at 297 at n.5.

9 But, this rule is not absolute. Where a defendant moves for and obtains summary  
10 judgment before the class has been properly notified, the defendant waives the right to have  
11 notice sent to the class and the decision binds only the named plaintiffs. *Id.* This is because  
12 where a defendant moves before class certification, the defendant assumes the risk that a  
13 judgment will not have the effect of res judicata on the absent class members *Id.* “And Rule  
14 23(b)(3) class certification cannot bind a class without providing adequate notice as required by  
15 the Due Process Clause.” *Faber v. Ciox Health, LLC*, 944 F.3d 593, 603 (6th Cir. 2019).  
16 Furthermore, “class certification remains functionally incomplete until class members receive  
17 notice.” *Id.* Where a class is certified, summary judgment is later granted, but notice has not been  
18 sent out—there is little chance that notice could be effective. *Id.* “Rule 23(C)(2)(B)(iv) requires  
19 that the notice inform class members that they “may enter an appearance through an attorney if  
20 [they] . . . so desire [] . . . that Rule is largely pointless if a district court grants summary  
21 judgment before notifying the class.” *Id.* at 604.

22 Here, notice has not been sent and summary judgment will be briefed before notice is  
23 even sent out. This places the parties squarely within the *Faber* circumstances. To be sure, this  
24 delay was avoidable. Plaintiffs had a class notice plan in place since early 2019. And, they had  
25 the list of addresses needed since April 29, 2019. There is no question that those addresses came  
26 *directly from* ICE. Nor was there any question that there was not additional information to  
27 gather. At that time, and anytime thereafter, Plaintiffs should have simply effectuated the notice

1 plan, as ordered by the Court. Or, at a minimum, they could have filed their Motion to Amend  
 2 the Notice Plan long before the summary judgment deadline.<sup>4</sup> Alternatively, they could have  
 3 arranged for publication notice, radio notice, and social media notice while the issue of mailed  
 4 notice was resolved—to ensure all absent parties would have the benefit of due process. They did  
 5 not do either and their inexplicable delay now poses a serious threat of the significant issues  
 6 identified herein.

7 As GEO has not waived its right to have a judgment that is binding upon all absent class  
 8 members,<sup>5</sup> this rule raises two questions with respect to the timing of the instant motion: First,  
 9 should this Court reserve ruling upon Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment until after notice  
 10 has gone out (but before trial begins) to ensure any judgment is binding upon the entire class?  
 11 *Bhattacharya v. Capgemini N. Am., Inc.*, 324 F.R.D. 353, 367 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“the Court defers  
 12 ruling on the parties' pending cross-motions for summary judgment to allow time for class  
 13 members to receive notice of the action and to avoid running afoul of the rule against one-way  
 14 intervention.”). And, second, if summary judgment will be fully briefed before notice is sent out,  
 15 will the notice to plaintiffs meaningfully comply with Rule 23? *Kleiner*, 751 F.2d at 1202  
 16 (“[I]ndividual class members are entitled to intervene as of right.”) As this Court has broad  
 17 discretion in managing the class procedures under Rule 23, GEO respectfully requests that the  
 18 Court clarify whether any ruling on the motions for summary judgment will bind the class or  
 19 only the current parties to the litigation.

20 \_\_\_\_\_  
 21 <sup>4</sup> Indeed, the original summary judgment deadline was December 15, 2019. The issue of amending the notice  
 22 plan should have been raised with sufficient time before *that* deadline to allow for a sixty (60) day notice plan  
 and conferral between the parties.

23 <sup>5</sup> At oral argument, Plaintiffs argued that GEO had filed summary judgment multiple times in this action and  
 24 therefore had “waived” their right to force Plaintiffs to send notice. GEO did not move for summary judgment  
 25 multiple times in this case. In fact, Plaintiffs emphasized this fact to their advantage when responding to the  
 26 Court's proposed Order in the State of Washington case stating that “[b]riefing on summary judgment has not  
 27 yet commenced in this action.” ECF 189 at 1. Further, GEO did not move for summary judgment prior to class a  
 ruling on class certification (although it did do so before notice was sent out to meet the deadlines in this case.).  
 Thus, GEO has not waived its right to notice. In contrast, Plaintiffs have filed a motion for summary judgment  
 in advance of notice going out. Such a procedure carries with it two risks: (1) that the ruling is binding only  
 upon the named Plaintiffs or (2) that their motion should be denied as procedurally improper.

1 **CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the notice plan should be denied.

3 Respectfully submitted, this 15th day of January, 2020.

4 By: s/ Colin L. Barnacle

5 **AKERMAN LLP**

6 Colin L. Barnacle (*Admitted pro hac vice*)  
7 Ashley E. Calhoun (*Admitted pro hac vice*)  
8 Adrienne Scheffey (*Admitted pro hac vice*)  
9 Allison N. Angel (*Admitted pro hac vice*)  
10 1900 Sixteenth Street, Suite 1700  
11 Denver, Colorado 80202  
12 Telephone: (303) 260-7712  
13 Facsimile: (303) 260-7714  
14 Email: colin.barnacle@akerman.com  
15 Email: ashley.calhoun@akerman.com  
16 Email: adrienne.scheffey@akerman.com  
17 Email: allison.angel@akerman.com

18 By: s/ Joan K. Mell

19 **III BRANCHES LAW, PLLC**

20 Joan K. Mell, WSBA #21319  
21 1019 Regents Boulevard, Suite 204  
22 Fircrest, Washington 98466  
23 Telephone: (253) 566-2510  
24 Facsimile: (281) 664-4643  
25 Email: joan@3brancheslaw.com

26 *Attorneys for Defendant The GEO Group, Inc.*

**PROOF OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify on the 15th day of January, 2019, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b), I electronically filed and served the foregoing **DEFENDANT THE GEO GROUP, INC.’S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS’ PROPOSED AMENDED NOTICE PLAN** via the Court’s CM/ECF system on the following:

**SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER**

Adam J. Berger, WSBA #20714  
Lindsay L. Halm, WSBA #37141  
Jamal N. Whitehead, WSBA #39818  
Rebecca J. Roe, WSBA #7560  
810 Third Avenue, Suite 500  
Seattle, Washington 98104  
Telephone: (206) 622-8000  
Facsimile: (206) 682-2305  
Email: hberger@sgb-law.com  
Email: halm@sgb-law.com  
Email: whitehead@sgb-law.com  
Email: roe@sgb-law.com

**THE LAW OFFICE OF R. ANDREW FREE**

Andrew Free (Admitted *Pro Hac Vice*)  
P.O. Box 90568  
Nashville, Tennessee 37209  
Telephone: (844) 321-3221  
Facsimile: (615) 829-8959  
Email: andrew@immigrantcivilrights.com

**OPEN SKY LAW PLLC**

Devin T. Theriot-Orr, WSBA #33995  
20415 72nd Avenue S, Suite 100  
Kent, Washington 98032  
Telephone: (206) 962-5052  
Facsimile: (206) 681-9663  
Email: devin@openskylaw.com

**MENTER IMMIGRATION LAW, PLLC**

Meena Menter, WSBA #31870  
8201 164th Avenue NE, Suite 200  
Redmond, Washington 98052  
Telephone: (206) 419-7332  
Email: meena@meenamenter.com

*Attorneys for Plaintiffs*

*s/ Nick Mangels*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Nick Mangels