Defendant's Reply Re: *Barrientos*

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17cv01112-JLS-NLS

CoreCivic, Inc., a Maryland corporation,

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Counter-Claimant,

v.

Sylvester Owino and Jonathan Gomez, on behalf of themselves, and all others similarly situated,

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Counter-Defendants.

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Plaintiffs' Opposition to CoreCivic's request for supplemental briefing is itself a substantive brief. CoreCivic replies in turn, understanding that doing so may moot its request for further supplemental briefing.

1. Plaintiffs first contend: "Barrientos supports the Court's tentative decision to certify Plaintiffs' Forced Labor classes" because it "confirms that ICE detainees may establish claims for violations of the TVPA against CoreCivic where, as here, 'CoreCivic coerces alien detainees to perform labor... by, inter alia, the use or threatened use of serious harm, criminal prosecution, solitary confinement, and the withholding of basic necessities." (Dkt. 173 at 2, quoting Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 18-15081, 2020 WL 964358, at *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 28, 2020).) The passage they quote, however, was not the court's holding; rather, it was the court's recitation of what the plaintiffs had alleged in their complaint. See Barrientos, at *1 ("Appellees' complaint alleged that, far from operating a 'voluntary' work program, CoreCivic coerces alien detainees to perform labor at Stewart by, inter alia,") (emphasis added). CoreCivic's Notice accurately quoted the court's holding: "All we hold today is that the plain language of the TVPA brings within its scope for-profit government contractors operating work programs in federal immigration detention facilities, and such entities are not categorically excluded or shielded from liability under the TVPA." *Id.* at *7.

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CoreCivic does not dispute that this Court reached the same conclusion in denying its motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 38 at 7-10.) But that ruling/holding—that Plaintiffs *may* bring a TVPA action against a government contractor operating a federal detention facility—is not a basis *to certify* the Forced Labor Classes. It simply begs the question: does each putative class member actually have a viable TVPA claim? As discussed in Point 3 below, that question cannot be answered "yes" or "no" in one stroke. *See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (a common contention is one that is "capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke"); *id.* (a common question that merely asks whether putative class members "have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law" is not enough to certify a class).

2. Plaintiffs next argue that CoreCivic "misrepresents" *Barrientos*, contending that the court was careful to limit its holding to the certified question. Again, it is Plaintiffs who misconstrue *Barrientos*. What the court refused to venture into was any application of its holding to the particular allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint:

Because our review is limited to the legal question of the TVPA's applicability to private contractors operating federal immigration detention facilities, we do not at this time address whether the factual allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a TVPA claim. ...

¹ Plaintiffs actually assert that CoreCivic's misrepresentation was "deliberate." (Dkt. 173 at 3.) These baseless, ad hominem attacks on CoreCivic and its counsel must stop. Although resorting to such tactics reveals the weakness in Plaintiffs' counter-arguments, it is beneath the dignity of the Court and counsel. (*See*, *e.g.*, Dkt. 134 at 13-14 (accusing Defendant of "surreptitiously" and "slyly altering" answer); Dkt. 134 at 18 (accusing Defendant of "blatantly misstat[ing] applicable law"); Dkt. 136 at 2-3 (accusing Defendant of "misrepresentations"); Dkt. 139 at 2 ("Defendant continuously minimizes, excuses, and justifies the inappropriateness of its actions."); Dkt. 148 at 2 (accusing counsel of advancing a "contrived legal standard"); Dkt. 156 at 6 n.5 ("One might wonder whether CoreCivic's aside is simply to highlight the criminal histories of some detainees (inmates or civil) while critical motions are pending before the Court.").

Because we limit our review to the discrete and abstract legal issue of the TVPA's applicability to a certain class of cases, we are not concerned with the specific factual allegations in the complaint ... In other words, we do not address whether the complaint in this case sufficiently alleged a violation of the TVPA, assuming it applies to private contractors like CoreCivic. ... Indeed, we decline to address the adequacy of the complaint—or any other fact-intensive inquiry—at this stage in the litigation."

Barrientos, at *1, 5 (emphasis added). As discussed in Point 3 below (and block quoted in CoreCivic's Notice), the court's discussion excluding from the TVPA certain forced labor and discipline in the custodial detention setting was part and parcel of its answer to the certified legal question.

3. Plaintiffs last contend that *Barrientos* has "nothing to do" with whether they and the putative class members have a viable TVPA claim or the class certification analysis. It certainly does. The court held that its decision does not "call into question longstanding requirements that detainees or inmates be required to perform basic housekeeping tasks" and should "not be read to imply" that "basic disciplinary measures" authorized by ICE detention standards give rise to TVPA liability. *Barrientos*, at *7 & n.5 (citing the PBNDS). Indeed, both the United States and counsel for the plaintiffs—who are putative members of the National Forced Labor Classes in this case—agreed that conduct that complies with ICE detention standards does not violate the TVPA. (Dkt. 118-7 at 47-53; http://www.call.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings, search Case No. 18-15081 [*Barrientos* Oral Argument].)

What does ICE require? ICE requires *all* detainees to "maintain their immediate living areas in a neat and orderly manner." 2011 PBNDS § 5.8(C); *Barrientos*, at *2. ICE instructs detainees: "You must keep areas that you use clean, including your living area and any general-use areas that you use." (Dkt. 118-7 at 13.) ICE prohibits certain conduct and authorizes a range of discipline for

any infraction—for example, "[e]ncouraging others to participate in a work stoppage or to refuse to work" is a High Offense (214); "[r]efusing to clean assigned living area" is a High Moderate Offense (306); and "[b]eing unsanitary or untidy" and "failing to keep self and living area in accordance with posted standards" is a Low Moderate Offense (413).² 2011 PBNDS, § 3.1.A; *Barrientos*, at *3 & *7 n.5. (*See also* Dkt. 118-7 at 13 ["If you do not keep your areas clean, you may be disciplined."].) A range of discipline is authorized for each category of offenses (High, High Moderate, Low Moderate), but the spectrum includes a warning, a reprimand, restriction to housing unit, loss of job, change of housing, loss of privileges (e.g., commissary, vending machines, movies, recreation), disciplinary segregation, and initiation of criminal proceedings. *Id*.

In light of these ICE standards, Plaintiffs' allegations may or may not establish a viable TVPA claim depending on the circumstances. For example, Plaintiffs allege: CoreCivic requires detainees to clean their "living areas" under threat of discipline, and punishes those who "refused to work," (Dkt. 67, ¶ 16); they contend that CoreCivic requires detainees to maintain their common living areas under threat of discipline, (Dkt. 114-1 at 14-16; Dkt. 118 at 10-14); they avow that they complied with orders "to clean or perform other work" because other detainees who "refuse[d] to clean" were disciplined, (Dkt. 84-3, ¶¶ 23-24 [Owino]; Dkt. 84-4, ¶¶ 19-20 [Gomez]); and the handful of putative class members who submitted declarations avow that they were forced to "perform[] cleaning tasks [of] communal and private areas" and disciplined if they "refused to follow orders," (Dkt. 84-5, ¶ 3 [Carillo]; Dkt. 84-6, ¶ 3 [Dubon]; Dkt. 127-4, ¶ 3 [Santibanez]; Dkt. 144-3, ¶ 3 [Geh]).³

² Courts have also recognized that work stoppages are deliberate disruptions of the regular order of a prison, *Pilgrim v. Luther*, 571 F.3d 201, 205 (2d Cir. 2009), and that the deliberate untidiness throughout a facility compromises the health and safety of detainees and staff, *Bijeol v. Nelson*, 579 F.2d 423, 424 (7th Cir. 1978), *House v. Vaught*, 993 F.2d 1079, 1085–86 (4th Cir. 1993).

³ Contrary to Plaintiffs' recent assertion (Dkt. 169 at 3-4), CoreCivic *did* argue that

Whether any particular allegation rises to the level of a TVPA violation can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. For example, what were the "cleaning tasks" they were ordered to do? Was the detainee ordered to perform a basic housekeeping task or to simply clean up after himself? Did the order "to clean" involve a personal or immediate living area, maintaining a common living area, or some other area of the facility? For those who claim they were threatened with or actually disciplined for refusing to work, was their refusal part of an organized work stoppage?

For purposes of class certification, these questions must be asked of each class member to determine whether they have a viable TVPA claim. No single question can generate a common answer for every putative class member, which Plaintiffs guess is "several thousands." (Dkt. 84-1 at 21.) Because these individual questions predominate over any conceivable common question, the National Forced Labor Class cannot be certified. *See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo*, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016) ("An individual question is one where members of a proposed class will need to present evidence that varies from member to member, while a common question is one where the same evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing [or] the issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.") (alteration in original, internal quotation marks and citation omitted).⁴

⁴ These predominant questions are in addition to the many others that require individualized determinations, including whether the detainee (1) was actually threatened with harm, and (2) worked because of that apparent threat of harm. (Dkt. 118 at 36-38; Dkt. 164 at 5-7.)

(C.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2019), is distinguishable. (Dkt. 164 at 5-7.)

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Geh cannot be substituted in as a class representative (Dkt. 145 at 7 & n.5). CoreCivic has also explained why *Novoa v. GEO Group, Inc.*, 2019 WL 7195331,

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19	Sylvester Owino and Jonathan	NO. 3:17-cv-01112-JLS-NLS
20	Gomez, on behalf of themselves, and all others similarly situated,	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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	Certificate of Service	17cv01112-JLS-NLS

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